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Latin American firms appear to have been going internation al at an
increasing rate during the last few yearso

Although this is an area where

practice is far ahead of theory and academic interest, at least the topic of
"joint enterprises" by Latin American organi'.?:ation s is attracting increasing

·, 1
attention within the region o

It will be seen below that into this ark one can

place animals of very different species.

Therefore, this paper will cast a wide,

exploratory net: it will try to say something about Direct Foreign Invest·,,,st1t
{DF!) either by public or private Latin American (LA) organizatio ns, within or
outside Latin America.

It will examine the formation of both Trans-Natio nal

2
Corporation s (TNCs) , and "true" Multi-Natio nal Corporation s (MNCs) owned and
controlled by Latin Americanso

In keeping with the exploratory spirit of this

essay, comparable experiences of non-LA, but semi-indust rialized countries
{whether small or not), will also be discussedo
Quantitative evidence which may be used to convince the skeptic that
we are dealing with an important phenomenon is not easily foundo
is happening is at the fringes of local law, or of recent origin 0

Some of what
National

and internation al statistics have traditionall y worried about measuring inflows
rather than outflows of DFI for countries which concern us hereo

The paper will

have to rely on the documentatio n provided by some pioneering work, bits and
pieces of data, and much heresayo

A look at recent B~lance of Payments Yea~hooks·

of the Internationa l Monetary Fund is instructive regarding data problems:
nothing is recorded in the debit colum of·direct investment for countries such
as Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela, whose firms are often reported in
business publications to have invested abroado

Table I shows direct investment

outflows for some semi-indust rialized countries for which data are providedo
These are very likely to involve substantial underestima tion of the actual
flowso

Furthermore , it can be argued that at the early stages of "going

abroad 11 , the actual flow of funds across frontiers will be quite small; focussing
exclusively on them would miss much of what the process is abouto

This, of

course, is true about DFI in general; the hypothesis is that it is even more
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so for countries which concern us hereo

Two reasons may be given:

entrepreneurs will be especially cautious in their first ventures abroad,
putting as little of their own capital as they can, while exchange control
authorities, for reasons of their own, will encourage such behaviouro
Why should one be interested in looking into the cluster of topics
hidden under the title of this paper?

There is, first, the positive interest

in recording what is happening, and why it' is happeningo

In particular, a

look at DFI by semi-industrialized countries may cast new light oa theories
regar~ing DFI, TNCs and MNCs

One may be simply curious to see whether the

0

same theories regarding DFI among the rich apply for cross-investments among
the not-so-rich (yet not-so-poor)o

What are the differences and the similarities

regarding the way the decision to invest abroad is made by a US firm going to
France, in contrast with an Argentine firm going to Brazil?
Vernon really necessary?

Is a Latin American

Secondly, most policy-oriented people who have become

interested in these issues in Latin America have done so both as a way of reacting
against the excesses of TNCs operating from politically dominant states, and as a
way to encourage LA political and economic integration (or more generally, Third
3
World cooperation ), free of extra-LA dominanceo

One must worry that there

will be a tendency to regard all LA MNCs as "good things"o

There is room,

therefore, for normative analysis in this area, particularly if one wants to

avoid disappointments later ono

In fact, as it will be seen below, there are

already some unfortunate precedentso
Latin American Firffis Which Have Gone Abroad
This section will review some of the characteristics of LA DFI which has
emerged not primarily as a deliberate result of efforts to promote joint
ventures or other types of DFI as such.

That investment can be classified

as being private or public, and subclassified geographically as to whether
it takes place inside or outside Latin Americao
clear categories, of course

0

Not all DFI will neatly fall in

Besides the ambiguity regarding what is really

private, the public-private mix is likely to cover a wide rangeo

3

Who is a Latin American, or what organization is really Latin American, is also
open to debateo

Is FIAT-Ar:gcntina operating in Venezuela or Bolivia different

from FIAT-Italy operating in those countries?

Also remember that Mro Onassis

carried an Argentine passport and that Mro Vesco is a species of Costa Ricano
Other examples of multinational families and individuals could be giveno
Finally, while Panama and the Bahamas are geographically within Latin America, LA
DFI there appears quite different in nature from that going, say, to Bolivia.
The central hypothesis is that as capitalistic, semi-industrialized, and
somewhat open LA economies move up the per capita income ladder, one will begin to
observe some outflow of DFI, either from private or from market-oriented public
enterprises, even as those countries continue to be net receivers of DFio
hypothesis can be extended to countries such as Spain and Irelando

The

Indeed in these

countries the apparent paradox of cross-investment may appear in sharper re.lief
than in Latin America, because even as they offer generous incentives to DFI
inflows (often justified by references to th Pi r ;d 1 P.E;P.<l sci-lrci 1-y of 1 ocr11 s,wings
and entrepreneurship), some of their local firms go abroad without any kind of
government supporto

Finally, even in socialist countries such as Yugoslavia and

Hungary one could expect tendencies for some firms active.in foreign markets to
set up plants abroado

In short, many enterprises in semi-industrialized countries

can be expected to go through a cycle which starts with production for the home
market, typically enjoying some form of protection; then moving towards·exporting
an

increasing share of their

abroado

output; and finally setting up production facilities

A look at evidence on private LA DFI may shed some light on this hypothesis.
Argentine firms, not surprisingly, appear as pioneers in this field.

Siam

di Tella, during the 1920s, first began exporting metallurgical products to
Uruguay, Brazil and Chileo

In 1928 it set up plants in those countries, while

4

establishing commercial agencies in New York and Londono

Bunge y Born, which

started as a grain dealing firm, appears to have turned into a TNC before SIAM Di
5
Tella, and certainly has gone beyond Latin America in its investment interests •
Alpargatas,

also an Argentine firm, appears to have invested in other Latin American

countries before the second world waro

During the 1950s several Argentine firms set

- 4 -

up plants elsewhere in Latin America, particularly in Brazil; examples

include Bagci, Yelmos, Grassi,Wobron,

Sibra, Semperer y Cohen, etco

There is a shadowy borderline between non-DFI forms of foreign
interests (exporting, financial, marketing and commerlcial agenci~s
abroad) and DFI proper but it is likely that unusual LA entrepreneurs and
interests and the Cuban Bacardi

their firms, such as the Bolivian Patino
,

company, engaged in the latter also before the ~econd world war, particularly

within countries of the regiono

Comparison of their histories with those

of other small country mavericks such as the Irish Guinness, may eventually
prove fruitfulo

One may note in passing that the transition from reliance

on the domestic markets to a rather high degree of "multinationalization"

appears particularly fast for these small country mavericks.
While these historical examples are of some interest, the bulk
of LA DFI within the region seems to have arisen since the early 1960s, and
its expansion appears to have accelerated during the 1970so

Between

1930 and about 1960, exchange controls and inward-looking foreign trade
policies no doubt hampered the development of this phenomenono

This spontaneous

private LA DFI, a good share of which occurs behind the backs of public agencies
6
.
charged with administering remaining exchanges and trade controls, is
concentrated in several geographical patterns, such as Argentine and Brazilian
cross-investments and into bordering countries; Colombian and Venezuelan DFI
into each other's markets, as well as in bordering and nearby countries; and
Caribbeano

Mexican DFI in Central America and the

generalizations may be offerred on these patternso

Two tentative descriptive
First, a large share of the

DFI goes from a relatively advanced (and large) LA country to a relatively
less developed (and smaller) LA country
propinquity is apparento

7
O

Secondly, certain geographical

Brazilian DFI in Paraguay is more likely than in

Honduras> and the opposite is true for Mexican DFI.
enthusiasts already call attention to this trendo

"Sphere of influence"
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Why do private LA firms go abroad?
Why do private LA firms decide to invest in other countries of

Latin America?

Those familiar with positive theories of direct foreign

investment will find no.surprising answers, although tte mix of motivations may

be different for the Latin American varietyo

First of all, as emphasized

by the Hymer theory _one finds a "special asset" in LA firms engaged in

horizontal DFI, typically some kind of firm-specific adaptation of for~ign
technology to a relatively small scale of operation, and/or some adaptation of
8
product design to Latin American conditions o

Such a "special asset" is the

result of accumulated learning by the firm, which can be applied in new markets
at low marginal costso

It emerges as a necessary condition for the firm going

Some examples may put flesh in what is meant by a "special asset 11 :

abroado
a)

An Argentine firm developed machinery to adapt exhaust pipes for

automobiles, of a generic type, to specify models of cars, without
the need of large production runs.

Uruguayan entrepreneurs heard

about it, and sought to fonn a joint venture with the Argentine firm

in Uruguay, with the Argentine firm pro\riding the technology and some
used machinery as its capital share (and little or no foreign cxehangc)o

b)

Another Argentine firm gave up making radio cabinets with the

techniques requiring large scale operations; in the process it had
to redesign many aspects of the radto itselfo

When a new radio plant was

set up in Bolivia, the Bolivian producer sought the Argentine (adapted)
technology and eventually they formed a joint ventureo
c)

When FIAT-Italy entered the Venezuelan market it called upon FIAT

Argentina and its engineers, who.have adapted the FIAT models to Latin
American conditionso

(This may or may not lead to formal association.

between the Argentine and Venezuelan subsidiaries)o
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This type of LA DFI may be interpreted as part of a two-step diffusion
of technology, involving either product or process adaptation.

One can

speculate that it occurs mainly in activities where the world technological
frontier is not advancing very fast, allowing LA firms to be not far
from ito

The closer the LA firms are to the world technological frontier, the

easier it will be for them to compete with traditional TNCs.

In that

competition, they will benefit from lower salaries earned by domestic engineers
and semi-skilled labor, as well as from the more flexible attitude which lack of
a world-wide organizational structure gives themo
As suggested in the Argentine-Bolivian example given above, much of the
LA

DFI into the smaller countries is triggered by the erection by those

countries of barriers against goods imported from the larger ones.

The Argentine

f~rm facing loss of the Bolivian market for its radios tried to preserve a
market for its radio components by setting up a joint venture in Bolivia, just
as previously U.S. and European DFI went to Argentina following the erection

of Argentine import restrictions.

Flows of machinery, parts, technology and

profit payments in these circumstances act as substitutes for trade in some
commodities; whether such a substitution is desirable from the viewpoint
of either regional economic efficiencey or regional integration is a moot

questiono

Even when tariff barriers are held constant, the desire to be

closer to an important market previously serviced by exports may motivate outflows
of DFI from the largest semi-industrialized countries of Latin America.

The transfer of adapted technoJogy in activities where fresh technology
changes are becoming less frequent in industrialized economies is likely to
involve institutional arrangements somewhat different from those surrounding
inves tme.nts transferring rapidly changing technology.

Indeed, it appears

that horizontal LA DFI involves joint ventures, rather than the creation of
fully owned subsidiaries, to a greater extent than DFI from industrialized countries.
Some observers even deteet a natu~al tendency for horizontal LA DFI within the
region to "fade-out", and for investors from the host country to take a majority

-

I

-

As with United States DFI in Canada and Mexico but not in Europe,
horizontal LA DFI within the regJ.on is not the exclusive preserve of very
large companies; a good share of this investme11t is carried out by mc.:dium
sized firmso

The same characteristic has been noted for Spanish DFI; indeed,

in this case the absence of large firms in a rapidly expanding outflow of
.

9

Spanish investment has caused some wonder o Contrary to the typical LA case,
Spanish DFI, while not given special incentives, is fairly easily registered
with the authorities, so it could not be argued that it is the quasi-legal
. (or downright illegal) channels used for outflowing investment which discourages
firms with high profileo

An obvious hypothesis (but no more than that) to cover

these observations is that medium sized firms-have been on the whole more active
than larger firms in adapting technology to conditions in semi-industrialized

countrieso

In fact, most LA private DFI within the region has occurred in

manufacturing branches such as light engineering, including automobile parts and
machine tools; domestic appliances and other consumer durables; and textiles;
activities in which medium-sized LA-owned firms have been active·in import
substitution for several yearso

These investments typically involve equity

participation by nationals of no more than two countries, and their size is
modest by international standardso
Export promotion policies in the maJor semi-industrialized Latin American
countries, as in the case of Spain, were an intermediate step preceding
significant outflows of private DFL

An Ar.gentine firm, for example, exporting

most machinery for a "turn-key" plant ordered by a foreign customer will naturally
consider the possibility of taking some equity into that planto

The several

economic integration efforts within Latin Ame~ica, even when modest in actual
results, also focussed entrepreneurial attention on nearby markets and multiplied
contacts among businessmeno

Acceierated improvements during the 1960s 1.n intra

LA communications (air links, telephones, etco) also help explain the not

surprising fact that most horizontal private LA DFI has stayed within the regiono
One may wonder how far this type of investment will roam the world in its search

for new markets where its technological insights can be best exploited by setting
1m

lnrril

nl<>nt-~-

~n,:mi~h nFT

it- mriv hP nnrPil-

r:m hP

found in the United Kingdo:u
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and the Vnited States, besides its more predictable location 1.n Portugal, Latin

. 10 •
.
an d Afr1ca
Amer1.ca
Private LA entrepreneurs have historically invested part of their portfolio
outside the region, but usually in liquid form or in real estate.

Cuban

investments in Florida, for example, were substantial and well-kno\m ,even before

19590

Only a few entrepreneurs, such as the already mentioned Patino, as well as

the Cuban Julio Lobo, appear to have actually moved into DFI, strictu sensu,
outside the regiono

The outward orientation of economic policy in major Latin
Some scattered activity

American countries, however, could change this situation.

has been recently reported in this front; manufacturing LA firms are said to have
set up plants in Spain and Africa.

A Brazilian firm has found its way to Texas;

Irish officials of that country's Industrial Development Authority report interest
in the part of a Mexican textile fir'm and an Argentine engineering company for
taking advantage of Irish incentives for inflowing direct investment.

But the

magnitudes involved here are likely to be a small fraction of those for DFI within
Latin America; joint enterprises with Arab countries could be the most likely
candidates for rapid expansion of purely private LA manufacturing DFI outside the
region 1.n the near future.
Desire to diversify as a motivation for DFI has on the whole received little
emphasis in the literature on industrialized countries.

One may conjecture that the

smaller the home market, the more important will diversification be as an additional
motivation for DFI.

A United States firm, confident in local political stability and

skeptical that foreign business cycles will much diverge from that in the United
States, will be less interested in spreading risks globally than Spanish or Argentine
firms,.

Indeed, much recent Argentine DFI into Uruguay and Brazil, as well as Peruvian

DFI into Venezuela, can be regarded more as capital flight than as DFI.
cases, both capital and capitalists leave the home country.

In some

Insofar as entrepren-

eurs belong to social groups deemed culturally "marginal" in their home countries,
such mobility as well as the desire for diversification will naturally be greater.
Leaving aside extreme cases of economic and political instability, it remains
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plausible that a desire for diversification will push many a firm based

in small or semi-industrialized couDtries into going international

Firms

0

particularly vulnerable to the local business cycle, such as those involved

with construction or .other forms of capital formation, will naturally look
abroad to offset instability, first· by exporting goods or services, then by
setting up plants or large agencieso

As LA DFI becomes more generally accepted

' individuals who historically diversified
in home countries, it is conceivable that
their portfolios by buying foreign real.estate or liquid claims, will
instead (at least partly) purchase locally available stocks and securities
of those local firms which have plants abroado

Discussion of horizontal DFI has focussed primarily on that within
manufacturingo

Latin American banks, not all private, are showing great

dynamism in their expansion abroado

Many are flo~king to international

money centers, such as London, Panama and the Bahamas, as well as to other
Latin American countrieso

Much of this expansion can be explained as a result

of the relatively new outward looking policies of the major semi
industrialized countries in Latin America, leading to increasing use of world
private capital markets, as well as increasing servicing needs of LA exporting
firmso

The publicly owned BANCO do BRASIL has been listed among the top 50

international bankso

With assets of US$ 23 Billion it would rank 18th

place, ahead of such well-known banks as the Chemical New York Corporation,
Lloyds Bank and the Bank of Tokyo 11
0

Another publicly owned bank, the BANCO

DE LA NACION ARGENTINA also has substantial interests ab~oado

Venezuelan Banks

as well as the ubiquitous Barico do Brasil are reported to be competing
. actively with United States banks in the Chilean market

12

o

Venezuelan and

Colombian banks have formed joint ventures, with parallel activities in Bogota
and Caracas

13
o

Colombian banks are reported active in Ecuador and Panamao

Those left behind are getting itchy; the president of Mexico's second largest
private conunercial bank has called for changes in that country's regulations
to permit local financial institutions to operate internationallyo

The claimed

- 10 advantages to the Mexican economy of internation ally active domestic banks
were that such ban!:s could "support the opening of new export markets, support
and activate the search for new capital sources for Mexican industrial growth

and support the inter.nation al expansion of Mexican companies when this requires
. 1114
.
. f
.
.
. .
o
Joint-ventu re investment in oreign countries

Mexican, Argentine and Brazilian consulting firms have also multiplied
their regional activities; while not directly generating DFI themselves,
they can act as important catalytic agents in the promotion of LA joint
ventureso

The activities of some consulting firms in the Brazilian northeast

in acting as "marriage brokers" between firms located there and those from the
rich Brazilian south is noteworthy; while strictly speaking they refer to
intra-Brazi lian investment, the problems they deal with are very similar to
those of LA DFI within Latin Americao

Engineering consulting firms show much

promise for the diffusion.of adapted technologyo
The motivation for vertical DFI, involving both forward aud bat:kwanl
integration , is quite straight-for ward, and can be expected to apply to
profit-orien ted firms anywhereo

There are some examples of private LA DFI

going elsewhere in the region, and even outside, to secure access to raw

materials as well as to seek safe "downstream" customers for their outputo
But purely private investments in this category appear less important than

vertical DFI by public enterprises .

To these issues we now turno

Direct Forei~n Investment by Latin American Public Enterprises
Public enterprises play an important role in most Latin American
economies, even (or especially~ ) in those, such as that of Brazil, having
· 15 •
• 1 ism
.
. al reputation
•
as havens of capita
an internation

The public sector,

more generally, accounts for a good share of capital formation, typically
above 50 percent in the largest LA countries.
The projection abroad of some public LA enterprises , involved in
connnodities for which the home country is a net importer, is best described
as following the path of Italian~ Spanish and French state oil companies,
or what could be called a public TNC model.

For example, a recent report on

- 11·BRASPETRO, the foreign trade and investment arm ~f the Brazilian state
company, PETROBRAS, has it exploring for oil in half a dozen Middle East
countries, Madagascar plus Colombia, and having joined a consortium of
non-LA oil independents to bid on North Sea concessions off Norway

16
0

Other public LA enterprises, involved in connnodities for which the
home country is a net exporter, follow the practice of private TNCs from
industrialized countries which, having control over mineral deposits or
other raw materials, integrated forward to assure themselves of steady buyers
and some knowledge of the changing technology in material useo

As illustration

Brazilian state enterprise, Ciao Vale do Rio Doce,

one can refer to another

involved in iron ore mining and steel productuion, which may be building a new
steel mill in Egypt, together with Kuwaiti financing

17
0

Such backward and forward vertical integration of the great Latin
American state enterprises in raw material exploitation and in

11

basic" sectors

such as steel and aluminium, is to be expected, whether within or outside LA,
and whether alone or in joint ventures with other LA or non-LA firmso
this area are likely to be large, and perhaps too spectacularo

Projects in

State corporations

such as the well-established PEMEX or newcomers like the Venezuelan state oil company
and the Chilean state copper company are likely to become prominent in various
types of vertical DFio

An interesting example of a binational joint venture

involving two public oil corporations is that between the Argentine and Bolivian
enterprises (YPF and YPFB, respectively), to build a pesticide plant in Boliviao
It is expected that majority in equity holding will gradually be transferred

·
18
from YPF to YPFB o
It is generally accepted that uncertainty regarding availability or price
of the upstream good, and the consequent need for information by downstream firms

will provide a powerful incentive for vertical integration, even when
futures' markets exist

19

•

The use of explicitly public enterprises as national

agents for the buying or selling of the "upstream good" seems to appear more
often, however, in semi-industrialized than in fully industrialized countries
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which were "early comers"o

As with public banks, those organizations estab-

lish close links with small and medium-sized local private manufacturing firmso
Public LA enterprises have gone abroad in areas other than that of
natural resources.

An early example of a joint venture involving·both public

and private capital in the FLOTA MERCANTE GRANCOLOMBIANA, created in 1946 with
the participation of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, at a time when extra
regional shipping companies exerted substantial monopoly powero

This enter

prise has suffered several ups and downs, including the withdrawal by Venezuela
in 195J, pressures from the U.So State Department on charges of "discrimination",
and treatment by other Latin American countries as it were just another foreign

shipping lineo
A more recent, but also far from successful example of mostly-public
LA joint venture is Monomeros Coloinbo-Venezolanos, a highly capital-inten;:;ive

petrochemical project, which started operations arouhd 1972, and which
has been plagued by technical and management problemso

Monomeros operates

behind substantial protection and its demand for unskilled labor is negligible;
it stands as a warning that the type of mistakes made at the national level
under import substitution policies can be repeated at multinational level under
the banners of integration and joint enterpriseso
More encouraging are the binational public companies recently set up
between Paraguay and Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, and between other countries

in the River Plate basin to exploit common hydroelectric resources on that
basin, which may be compared with the authorities for the Ruhr and the Tennesee
valleyso

These projects typically involve substantial investmentso

Also

noteworthy are the Central American public company, COCESNA, active in air
navigation, and investments by the public Chilean steel corporation in Ecuador,

in joint venture with investors from that countryo

It will be seen below that

proposals abound for new binational or multinational ventures involving LA public
enterprises, whose basic motivation is often noneconomico

But before looking

at the future, explicit discussion of normative criteria is called foro

- 13 Gains and losses from Latin American Direct Foreign Investment
The evaluation of the economic and social consequences of outflowing
or inflowing LA DFI of the more spontaneous variety raises all the complicated
issues such an evaluation has raised elsewhereo

In particular, many Latin

American public officials are learning to evaluate DFI from a home country view
point, thus deepening their understanding of the phenomenono

Is Argentine DFI

in Uruguay and Drazil good or bad for the Argentine balance of payments?
For'Argentine employment? Should it be part of Argentine export promotion
policies?

Are "our" exports and royalty earnings understated?

entrepreneurs taking more money out than they bring back in?
(and fallacies) are familiar oneso

Are "our"
The issues

Eager investors will highlight how their

activities promote exports of machinery and parts; worried public officials will
devise schemes to encourage profit repatriationo
Even more familiar are the preoccupations of Bolivian and Hondurian
officials,.,

Is it such a good idea to have so many Brazilians and Mexicans

running around "our" country?

May·"we" not be trading a first-rate imperial

power for a second-rate one?

Such preoccupations could lead, say, Ecuador to

treat DFI from Germany more kindly than that from Per~.
More than cost-benefit analyses of specific investment projects may be at
stakeo

As firms in the major semi-industrialized countries of Latin America

expand their exports, to either the region or elsewhere, barriers to their
establishing plants abroad on their own or in joint ventures may weaken their
ability to compete with firms from extra-regional countries where such foreign
investment is, if anything, subsidizedo

Indeed, some cases have already beeri

recorded where the formation of, for example, an Argentine-Uruguayan joint
venture was the result of competitive pressure from an extra-regional TNc

20
o

Having gone this far in competitive struggles for world markets, the logic of
such competition could dictate growing DFI for LA firmso
At this point a methodological parenthesis is in ordero

If DFI and

the creation of joint ventures were viewed primarily as mechanisms to move
cap'ital from one country to another, Brazilian investments in Uruguay or
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Europe: or Colombian investments in Venezuela, would appear as abnormalo

When

the home country has employment or balance of payments problems, many would
challenge the desirability of outward flows of DFio
One may view corporations, of which Mi.iCs and TNCs are particular
examples, as a type of organization which emerges to replace arms' length
marketso

The well-known reasons for such a substitution are several: a) when

markets do not work well because of uncertainty regarding input sources, or
when uncertainty about sales endanger large fixed investments; b) to benefit from
increasing returns to developing or collecting information and knowledge
including firm-specific adapted technology; and c) to exercise market power in
buying or sellingo
This vie'\\" implies that the creation of LA MNCs or TNCs may unprove on
real-world markets, or they may noto

It says little on how gains and losses

from improving on markets, or from destroying them, are shared between home and
host countries, or inside each countryo

It should also be clear that the creation

pf new LA MNCs or TNCs is not the only nor necessarily the best way to deal with
uncertainty, need for information or lack of market power,

from either the

private or social viewpoint, where the social viewpoint could include those of
Contractual arrangements of various sorts,

several associated countries.

limited in time, could often do better than setting up new permanent organizationso
Observers in Latin America have noted with interest the reluctance of
governments in industrialized countries to allow their large corporations either
to go broke, or to be taken over by OPEC moneyo

To some this suggests that

even purely private organizations become charged with a certain social or
national interest after reaching a given size, particularly in a world where
other countries have their own heavy-weight championso

The idea is that for a

given Latin American country, or a group of them, locally-control led TNCs or
MNCs can become reliable scanners, searchers and bargainers in uncertain, rough
and unreliable world markets

21

o

They are to become "our team" out there in the

cold, an attitude not unlike that of some foreign ministers of industrialized
rnimt-ri .,c: uhn h<>uP vi 1>u1Pd Pvf'n

their ourelv orivate TNCs. particularly those
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involved in raw material exploitation abroad, as very much part of the
"national team"o
The complex symbiotic relation between the state and large private or
public enterprises raises issues beyond the scope of this papero

But it

adds another note of agnosticism regarding the merits of LA MNCs or TNCs:
in evaluating these organisations much will depend on what kind of state lies
behind them, and on what groups actually control their activitieso (Consider
South African TNCs).
When outward DFI involves medium-sized firms exploiting their
technological wrinkles, even home countries with serious employment or balance
could be made better off simply because such an

of payments problems

activity may have higher returns abroad than the best alternative at home for
the firm.
It does not seem very fruitful to talk in general about the optimum
amount of outflowing DFI for Latin America, or for any individual
LA c.mmtry, nor to SP.P.k gP.nP.n1l rnl es regarding the optimum organization

of joint ventureso

It may perhaps be more helpful to first look for possible

"artificial" barriers and distortions hampering the flow of LA DFI, and the
creation of LA MNCs and TNCs, on the presumption that there should be moreo
Enthusiasts of LA joint ventures and LA MNCs list so many advantages to be
derived from them that one is tempted to ask: If such ventures are so
good, why are there not more?

Possible answers include: (a) they are on the

way, and with a vengeance, in which case arguments for additional promotional
public efforts lose much of their force, and indeed one may begin to worry
about their going beyond the social optimum; (b) there are barriers imposed by
archaic legislation or foolish public officials, which should be removed;
or (c) some social pump-priming is socially desirable, on a kind of "infant
organization" groundso

It is the second answer that interests us nowo

Lawyers were early comers to _the topic of joint LA enterprises, particularly
those associated with INTAL,and many were influenced by the European debates and
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.
int h.is field
experience

0

A key preoccupatio n was whether lack of uniform-

ity in LA company laws was a significant obstacle to Lhe formation of joint
LA enterpriseso

A major conclusion was that: "••othe creation of foreign

affiliates does not represent a serious difficulty from the viewpoint of (LA)
company lawso

This is especially due to the similarity in the way the (LA)

of commercial enterpriseso
countries regulate the structure and functioning
I
Therefore, in Latin America there do not exist the legal and psychologic al
barriers which in the European Economic Community have been blamed on the
diversity of legislation in this field

1123 o

In all LA countries it seems

possible to find more than one satisfactory legal mechanism to organize LA MNCs,
even in the more difficult case of public enterprises .
Barriers arising not from company laws but from economic legislation
are another mattero

A turbulent and not always profitable history of deal_ings

with foreign investors, as well as a history of balance of payments crises,
have been reflected in most LA countries in regulations which complicate capital
movements in general, and DFI in particular, whether incoming or outgoing.

The

traditional targets of such rules have been the exploitative non-LA foreign
investor and the local entrepreneu r seeking to take his capital abroado

Such

/

a defensive attitude is reflected in a hundred ways throughout the economic
legislation of most LA countries, and now, somewhat ironically, creates a barrier
to LA joint ventures and intra-LA DFI.

Indeed, the twists and turns of restrictions ,

exemptions and incentives in some LA countries may have the net effect of favoring

DFI from outside Latin America relative to that from other countries in the area.
A gi"ven LA country, for example, may have a smoothly working treaty with the
United States, to avoid double taxation of foreign investment, but not one with
neighbourin g countries

0

Countries within the Andean group have shown a special

preoccupatio n with existing differences in the treatment given to national
and other Andean firms in such matters as access to domestic credit and taxation,
especially that involving public enterprises •
. Neutrality between home and foreign investment, regardless of its
geographica l destination. and non-discrim ination among sources of inflowing

17 DFI will be· rejected in Latin America as desirable policy guidelines, for a
mixture of economic and non-economic reasons which have also defeated those
It

guidelines de facto if not always de j~re, in industrialized countrieso

is easy to imagine a treatment hierarchy developing; thus, some Andean countries
could end up discriminating among purely national, Andean 5other-LA, other-LDC,
and several types of other investments from industrialized countrieso

As

discrimination can arise in the formal and informal handling of the many incentive
schemes LA governments have to achieve regional, export and other goals,
discussions regarding LA DFI could lead to a re-examination of the effectiveness
and rationality of many of these rules, and not just from the viewpoint of
encouraging socially beneficial intra-LA DFio

One may hope that as many LA

countries become both home and host countries for DFI, those charged with over
seeing those flows will enrich and deepen their knowledge of both costs and
benefits of that process.
Joint ventures involving public LA enterprise_s, even when highly desirahle
on economic grounds, could be hampered by obstacles more powerful than those
facing private joint ventureso

The armed forces are influential in many public

enterprises, and they may fancy that "national security" would be threatened
by joint ventureso
their

(Try to imagine, for example, Argentina and Brazil merging

atomic energy research organizations, or Bolivia, Chile and Peru joining

an Andean steel corporation)o

In other cases, the non-military bureaucracies

running other national public enterprises will be more interested in maintaining
existing profitable links with extra-regional TNCs, which may or may not be
socially profitable, than in exploring new links and forming a common front

with other LA public enterpriseso
Some maJor proposals to foster joint ventures
Initiatives toward greater Latin American economic and political integra
tion have been the major motivation behind general proposals for accelerating
the creation of joint ventures among two or more LA countrieso

In a sense, this

coupling of commercial integration with cross or joint investments is a variation
on the theme played by the North Atlantic community since the second world waro

- 1e In Latin America, or the LDCs more generally' however, joint ventures are
viewed not only as complements to commercial integration (or trade liberal
ization), hut sometimes also as substitutes to full trade liberalization within
a given areao
As early as 1966 IoMoDo Little published a paper on "Regional
. 11 24
.
h
.
.
.
companies as an approac to econonu.c integration.
international
He

argued that even when full integration is not possible for whatever reason,

but when one or more industries can be reasonably established on a regional

basis, then a limited "industrial community" could still be made beneficial
to all partieso

The European Iron and Steel community was a clear precedento

In the Little proposal earnings would be fully paid out, the company should be
entirely tax-free, and it could buy its inputs in any marketo

Presumably

only projects where unit costs were below coiofo prices would be undertakeno
Little noticPd that it might be easier to negotiate a package deal involving
several industrieso

He also warned against the danger that the top management

of these companies could degenerate into a "Tower of Babel"o

For13ign aid could

help trigger the creation of these companies in LDCso
The Central American Common Market devised its ''Regime of Industries
of Integration" to go along with complete trade liberalization within that
area, but only two firms were set up under that regime (as of 1973)0

25

During its hapless life, the LAFTA has made equally unsuccessful moves toward
the creation of joint LA ventureso

Aware of these precedents, the Andean

Group produced its Decision~6, establishing a uniform regime for Andean
MNCs, on December 1971

26

o

This decision represents a compromise between having a given Andean
country treat all investors from other Andean countries as plain nationals
and treating them as "real" foreignerso

Andean MNCs are to be given by each

country treatment as favorable as that granted the most favored national
companies, which of course is a more favourable treatment than that given to
DFI under the Andean decisiontf24p particularly regarding taxes, credits, public
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purchases, profit remittances and areas where it is permitted to operate

0

Andean MNCs could be set up by two or more Andean countries, could have
public or private capital, and could have up to 40 percent of its capital from
non-Andean sourceso

But the chartering of these MNCs will be limited to

projects designed of "Andean interest" by the Group's authoritieso

The

expectation has been that these MNCs would be closely linked to (and facilitate
the adoption of)the sectorial plans of industrial development, or major

import substitution efforts at the Andean level, in areas such as metalworking,
chemicals, automobiles, fertilizers, petrochemicals and electronicso

Andean

MNCs in these areas would substitute, at least partly, for extra-regional
TNCs which would otherwise take advantage of the newly expanded and protected
markets.

These plans call for a parcelling out of the new industrial

activities among member countries, each "chosen instrument" having a monopoly
limited in time, and in extent by the level of the common external tariff.
The new MNCs could be clustered around these projects, in such a.way as to
minindze their social cost, and/or to provide an equitable fashion of sharing
costs and benefits.

One can speculate regarding the optimum clustering or

size of the ~1NCs, as well as the sequence in which the projects could be
undertaken

27

o

These MNCs are expected to help the least developed Andean

countries, Bolivia and Ecuador, in their taking advantage of special tariff
concessions granted by the larger Andean countries, and in the speedy construction
of the plants assigned to them under the industrial sectoral agreementso
One may also note that under Decision;~6 a Brazilian and a U.S. investor would
be treated equally; Argentine firms, on the other hand, have shown keen
interest in the Andean proposals, and have sought a special relationship with
the new Andean projects.
To the dismay of Andean enthusiasts Peru has failed to ratify Decision.::\\'46
(as of January, 1976).

Peruvian reservations are said to include fear of

capital flight, and a weakening of Peruvian company laws requiring workers'
participation in management

0

The Peruvian position brings out two key dilennnas

- 20 ...

in Latin American integration efforts, which also influence attitudes toward
LA DFI: that between the recognition of the importance of a dynamic LA private

entrepreneurial group, and doubts about it among technocrats of social-democrat ic
and further left leanings; and that between an emerging Andean and/or Latin
American conciousness and interi:>sts and more old-fashioned but strong national
interests and idyosincracies.
Early in 1976, the Andean Junta proposed the creation of a Multinational
Tel~phone Enterprise, expecting eventual Peruvian participation, which would
28
It remains to be seen
produce public telephone exchanges beginning in 1980
0

whether all of the Andean countries will approve that proposal, and how many
more such proposals will followo
Disappointments with the LAFTA and the alleged failure of "purely
d
.
1 tra d e 29 , h ave motivate
.
.
.
.
.
. 1" l'b
1ntra-reg1ona
measures for
1 eral1zat1on
coll1l1lerc1a
the search for other mechanisms to carry out LA integrationo

Joint LA ventures

are viewed by some as having the potential to forge stronger intra-LA links
than"fickle"trad e flows couldo

Those ventures may also bring together countries

now belonging to different integration efforts (Caribbean, Central American,
LAFTA and Andean)o
This line has been taken up by the new Latin American Economic System
{SELA, using the Spanish acronym), born in 1975 not without at least a normal
1
dose of kicking, screaming and confusion regarding the baby s sexo

and Venezuela were key leaders in the formation of SELAo

Mexico

A major goal of

SELA is the promotion of LA MNCs, involving any number of LA countries and

in any area of economic activityo

The idea is that those countries interested

in a given project would set up a working group to explore its feasibility;
the participating countries, as a token of their seriousness of purpose, will
finance each group

0

Pragmatism and flexibility are to be stressed, at least

according to some major SELA leaders.

So far the SELA approach seems more similar

to that of Little, discussed earlier, than to the Andean Decision-:\t'46.
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A navigation company has already been launched under the SELA umbrella,

involving Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamai~a, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and
Venezuela.

The Cuban presence, of course, is the most remarkable.

LA MNC, NAMUCAR, is so far a purely public sector initiative.

This

The project was

conceived as an alternative to established shipping lines in the Caribbean, but
its first steps have been quite modest, partly due to fears of the company being
. 3o o
db y Mexico
.
d 0IU1.nate

Mexico and Jamaica, with the plausible participation of

Venezuela, plan joint ventures which will include at least bauxite and alumina
producing plants in Jamaica, and a metallic aluminium plant in Mexico.
each plant will be owned 51 percent by the country

While

where it is located, it

has been agreed in principle that profits from all operations will be pooled
and distributed according to the overall investment shares.

Links

between these activities and NAffUCAR as well as joint international marketing
of part of the output are foreseen

31

•

Jamaica has also been reported to be

planning construction of a petroleum refinery iu c.:ooJJer:at:iun wi.th PEMEX, to
be supplied with Mexican and Ve11ezuelan oil

32
0

Venezuela, Colombia and Central America have set up another MNC, SUAVES
CENTRALES, for the marketing of Central American coffee; essentially,
Venzuelan money is being used to finance coffee stocks, so that coffee sales
can be timed to the maximum advantage of producers.

Venezuelan oil revenues

have also been used to set up a Trust Fund in the Interamerican Bank, with the
right to engage in equity capital operations, which is expected to promote
LA MNCs, particularly in fields previously shunned by international lending

agencies.
The several state development banks which exist in Latin America (NAFIN,
BNDE, etc.), as well as the Inter American Development Bank, the Andean
Development Corporation and other such regional'financial institutions are
expected to play catalytic :-:oles in the promotion of LA MNCs.
proposals, which may or may not be picked

up

by SELA, exist.

Several other
They are

all meant to increase cooperation among LA countries, and possibly lead to
the formation of LA MNCs.

It ago.in needs to be stressed that not all

- 22 desirable forms of cooperation will or should lead to the creation of formal
new organization so
The apparently impressive combined buying power of the national
state enterprises of Latin America, particularly for machinery and equipment
and technologica l services, suggests possible areas of cooperation, ranging
from the creation of LA MNCs to produce 1ocally those goods and services,
or to act as purchasing agents for the whole groupo

There may be here an

aggregation illusion; the totals for machinery purchases are likely to hide
great heterogeneit y in the types of commodities purchasedo

It may be

better to first expand the existing contact and ad-hoc contracts between, say,
LA state oil or steel enterprises, before complicated schemes are set upo

The

same applies for joint research and development efforts; it would be splendid
if Argentina and Brazil were to combine their atomic energy commissions in one
organization s open to other LA countries, but it is likely that the more
modest joint Andean research and development efforts in such areas as
tropical woods; nutrition and copper technology will yield tangible fruit
more quicklyo

A region with still much poverty should be on guard against

Concorde-typ e adventureso
Joint marketing of traditional and new LA exports represents a possible
area of expansion for LA organization s, as the region has ·historicall y fretted
under foreign middle-men reaping marketing quasi-rents .

This seems a logical

area for cooperation , even if many who saw no contradictio n between the
existence of United Fruit, Exxon, Hershey and Reynolds Aluminium and "the
free play of supply and demand in world markets" will shout "Cartel!" as
soon as LA countries try to take over the marketing of their exports from
those and other TNCs, even though in many cases the final outcome of the
change could take the world closer to competitive -textbook solutionso
National LA firms in the area of natural resources, even if banded together,
are unlikely to achieve the degree of backward and forward integration
which gave (and gives) classical TNCs their exhorbitant market powero
Joint state enternrises in the River Plate basin give grounds for hoping

23

that other border areas in LA, where natural resources (already discovered
or their existence only suspected) add to frontier tensions, could be developed
peacefully by joint ventures of the countries concerned~

A suitable blurring

of purely national sovereignties along, say, the Chilean-Bolivian-Peruvian
borders, and those between Colombia and Venezuela,and Venezuela and Guyana,
could have important economic and political payoffso

An all-Latin American

enterprise to build a new canal across Central America may become highly desirable
if the United States Senate hinders the revision of the unequal treaty now
governing the one across Panama.
SELA-type associations between LA and other LDCs have also been discussedo

Mexico and Tanzania, for example, plan joint ventures in sisal processing.
Venezuelan joint projects with other OPEC members are natural instruments
to cement that alliance 0

Argentina and Lybia, Brazil and Kuwait, are also coupled

in several plans and schemes.

Spain, after 40 years of solitude, may also play

a more dynamic role in LA.

Some concluding remarks
The largest and richest LA countries have moved or are quickly moving
into Southern European ranges of per capita income, and have developed
important industrial baseso

This fact, plus regional and cultural propinquity,

has led their private and public entrepreneurs to search in neighbouring
countries for markets, raw materials and deals of all kindso

Sometimes exports

are the outcome, or licensing agreements; but joint enterprises or other forms
of DFI may result
region.

0

This expansion is also taking some LA firms outside the

The DFI may involve little more than buying warehouses_ and service

agencies, or it can generate substantial production abroad.

Past LA experience

and objective conditions discouraging hubris, make these joint enterprises
and investments somewhat less unbalanced between home and host interests than
traditional DFI from industrialized countries.

The lack of a chummy home country

Marine Corps (or Intelligence Agency) is no guarantee that investors will prove

24

flexible and sensitive to host country conditionB, but it appears to help a bit
33
in making them, if not less interested in profits, somewhat less pushy
0

It remains to be seen how important outward flows of LA DFI will become, and how
large and widespread internationa l LA firms will get.

Upper bounds on their

expansion could cast some light on the role played by non-economic advantages in
the past expansion of TNCs from hegemonic,po werso
It has proven difficult to generalize as to the likely social costbenefit results of either spontaneous LA private DFI, or the several proposals
for LA MNCs discussed in this papero

This conclusion is in line with the

ambiguities surrounding the topics of foreign investment, where departures from
case-by-case evaluation are always risky, and with the complexities of
industrial organization .

Even less can be said in general about how the benefits

and costs of such enterprises will be distributed within each participatin g country.

Besides lack of clear a priori economic guidelines, further questions are
raised by powerful political preconceptio ns and cross curren'ts within Latin
America.

Some of the different ways of viewing LA M11'Cs, for example, were

reflected in the 1975 INTAL conference in Buenos Aires.

Particularly symbolic

were the remarks of a Mexican participant , on the one hand, arguing for LA
MNCs in large, state-sponso red projects, and ridiculing the prospects of LA
joint ventures to produce "combs and shampoos"; on the other hand a Brazilian
participant warned against converting LA MNCs into "mutual aid organizatio ns",
so hampered by restrictions even before they were operating thay they could

never become efficient enterprises .
Two nightmares are particularly influentialo

The first, which may be

called the "Dependencia " nightmare, views uncontrolled neocapitali stic
expansion of Latin American firms, even when led by local and public entrepren
eurs, as either a front or a first step in the consolidatio n of control of
the Latin American economy by TNCs from outside the region.

Examples of

FIAT Argentina expanding into Bolivia and Venezuela, or reports of Volkswagen
h'is
·
' 34 are, int
. America
. h'i n an d outsi'de Latin
.
elsewh ere wit
Brasi'1 moving

c.o
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view, typical of the processo

Even successful purely LA joint ventures are

dooffied to be taken over or manipulated by extra-regional TNCs in the
"Dependencia" scenario, where the export connection of much spontaneous
LA DFI is also viewed with suspicion.
The second nightmare may be given the "Statist-Protectionist" label.
The fear is that, partly as a reaction against the ea.rlier scenario, LA M..."lCs
will be created under close public sector tutellage, with their freedom of
action severely curtailed, and will engage in pursuing import substitution
goals, such as the creation of capital-intensive fertilizer plants, whose
social desirability is very doubtful.

To

make

matters worse, the trade

diversion which may be stimulated coulc:1. involve diverting purcha5es not from
outside Latin America, but from relatively efficient LA producers.

The new

organizations may not always, on balance, integrate more than they disintegrate.
SELA-type associations could weaken, for example, Andean solidarity, while Andean
MNCs could weaken links between Andean and non-Andean Latin American countries.
We have seen bits of evidence to feed both the "Dependencia. 11 and the
"Statist-Protectionist" nightmares.

Coupled with a priori agnosticism,

they may perhaps be useful to avoid becoming starry-eyed over the good new
sound of"LA M:tiCs".

Thorny issues hide behind this label.

For many years

public officials worried about how to control inflowing DFI, confident. in
their ability to control local firms.

As the _latter become international, their

flexibility and mobility increases, and their ability to react to public
policy is enhanced, for better or worse.

The issue of accountability, key in all

discussions about TNCs, will remain even if LA MNCs are set up only under
careful specified conditions, as the experience of LA national state enterprises
shows

0

One can also speculate that in many cases LA MNCs will be inferior

alternatives to a full-fledged Latin American comrr:on market.
But let me finish on a positive note.

On both economic and political

grounds one can conclude that LA t-~t-:Cs and LA DFI could become a positive force

in the region's development, if encouraged in a selective and rational fashicn.
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Neither prohibition nor across-the-board encouragement of inflowing DF:::. have
proven desirable polici~s for Latin America, and the same will apply to out
flows of DFio

The largest countries can use therr: to export ll'£.chinery and

expertise and decrease uncertainty in access to raw materials and marketso
Smaller countries can find the new DFI useful in their search for cheaper
technology, more suited for their local co,nditions, while diversifying their
sources of capital and expertiseo

Both small and large LA countries could

use the new organizations to drive better bargains vis-a-vis the outside world,
buying and selling.

And both small and large LA countries can together devise

new forms of joint ventures which, tapping their historical experience, could
reduce asymmetries and the risk of confrontation and uncompensated nationalizations,
thus promoting both investment and an equitable sharing of gains betwE.cn host
and home countrieso

This paper was written while the author was on sabbatical leave from
Yale University at Nuffield College, Oxford. Comments on earlier drafts bv
Gerald K. Helleiner, Charles P. Kindleberger, John Martin, Ernest Stern, •
Dan Usher and Laurence Whitehead are gratefully acknowledged. Seminars at
Nuffield College and at the Centre of Latin-American Studies of the Univer
sity of Cambridge were also helpful in the preparation of this paper. Miss
Mary Awre kindly typed several versions, giving them an English touch.
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TABLE

I

-

Direct Investment Abroad of Selected Countries
(Million SDRs)

Brazil

Colombia

Italy

Spain

1969

11

4

283

13

1970

14

4

110

43

1971

1

3

399

25

1972

25

1

198

52

1973

31

1

216

67

Sources:

International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Yearbook, 1969-73
(Washington, D.Co, 1974-75)
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FOOTNOTES

lo

A meeting, probably the first of its kind in Latin America, on the
"Promotio n of Joint Latin American Investmen ts and Enterpris es" was
It was sponsored

held in Buenos Aires on November 21 and 22 of 19750
by the Institute
that cityo·

for Latin American Integratio n (INTAL), located in

Most participa nts were from the LA business world, from

LA governmen ts, or from inter-Ame rican institutio nso

"Latin

· America" should be understood as including European ex-coloni es in
the Caribb.ean , which have become independe nt since the second world
waro

I here follow authors such as Charles Po Kindleber ger and Osvaldo
Sunkel, who apply the label of TNC to enterprise s owned and controlle d
primarily by citizens of one country, and which have investmen ts
in several other countrieso
3.

UNCTAD held a meeting in Geneva, during October 19/ '.>, cm ways to
encourage cooperatio n among developin g countries .

Joint enterpris es

figured prominent ly among the possible mechanism s of cooperatio n.

4.

This informatio n, as well as a good share of other informatio n and
ideas in this paper, owes much to the pioneering work of INTAL, and
particula rly to the research of Felix Pen'a and Eduardo White.
Bunge y Born achieved considera ble unwanted publicity during 1975, when
it was said to have paid Argentina guerrilla s a ransom of 60 million
dollars for the release of two heirs of one of the founding
familieso
in the U.S.

60

It was also said to be involved in the grain-ship ping scandal
See The New York Times, June 25, 1975, pp. 11 and 22.

This is the impression given by some entrepren eurs and represent atives
of private sector groups present at the November 1975 INTAL seminar,
mentioned in footnote 1

0

These observers also emphasized how the

expansion of LA DFI is accelerat ing.
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See Eduardo White and Jaime Campos, "Elementos para una polit1.ca

latinoamericana de empresas conjuntas", paper presented at the
November 1975 INTAL conference, mimeographed, PPo 7-80

Of 45

cases of joint Latin American enterprises examined, 80 percent
corresponded to projects located in lesser developed LA countries,
with the participation of firms from more developed LA countries.
Not all of these cases involved the private sectoro

Nearly half of

the cases involved countries 1.n the "southern cone" of Latin America
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay)o
8.

Besides the White-Campos paper, I here rely heavily on the valuable
paper by Marcelo Diamand, "Las Empresas Conjuntas Latinoamericanas:
Coincidencias y conflictos de Intereses", also presented at the INTAL
conference, and on conversations with Jorge Katzo

9.;

See the very useful paper by Jose Luis Moreno More, "Quince Anos de
Il)versiones Espanolas En F.J F.xtrnnjero", Informaci6n Comercial
Espanola, Noo 499, March 1975, PPo 91-107; especially po94.

Spanish

firms, however, appear less willing to share ownership with host
country investors than LA firms, according to this source (also po94).
10.

JOSE LUIS MORENO HORE, opo cit.,

Po 970

One may also note that some

Irish DFI is reported in the United States and the United Kingdom,
as well as in Nigeria, where the Irish "special relationship"- is
somewhat different from that linking Ireland to the other two countries.
See the Sunday Times (London), February 29, 1976, po54 0

Yugoslav-

owned plants are said to exist in Holland and Sweden, producing
motorbikes; less surprising is the presence of Yugoslav construction
firms, hiring Yugoslav workers, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

. 11.

See "A world financial survey", The Economist of London, February 14,
1976; Po 30 of the surveyo

120

See Business Latin America, January 14, 1976; p.15o

Financing foreign

trade is said to be the main business of the Banco do Brasil in Chile.
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130

See Business Latin America, December 31, 1975; Po 4240

Colombian

law severely limits activities of foreign banks, but the law retains
special treatment for banks from other Andean countries as long as
Colombian capital receives reciprocal.treatmeuto

.

.

140

See Business Latin America, January 28, 1976; Po 320

150

See Werner Baer, Isaac Kerstenetzky and Annibal Villela, "The Changing
role of the state in the Brazilian economy", World Development,
Volo 1, Noo 11, November 1973, PPo 23-34.

For the Argentine case,

see my "The Argentine state and economic growth: A historical
review", in Gustav Ranis, editor, Government and Economic Development
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)
See,Business Latin America, July 16, 1975, po228.

It has been argued

that early Brazilian recognition of the Angolan MPLA was related to
PETROBRAS interest 1n exploiting the Cabinda oil fieldo
America,

See Latin

February 6, 1976, Po47o

See The Economist of London, August 9, 1975, p.64 0

180

See Business Latin America, July 5 1973, PP• 209-2100

190

See K.Jo Arrow, "Vertical integration and communication", The Bell
Journal of Economics, Spring 1975, Vol. 6, Noo 1, especially Po 173
and 1820

200

But there is at least one case where this process, alas, culminated in
the new enterprise selling out to an extra-regional TNC.

In other cases

the acquisition of, say, a Uruguayan firm by an Argentine one,may be
motivated by the desire to eliminate a competitor.

See Business

Latin America·, October 10, 1973, pp. 322-323.

210

This view is not incompatible with the emphasis given by some
development economists to "institution building", above and beyond
improving markets in developing countries.

The institution building

may start with efficient public utilities and rural extension services,
move to create efficient local steel corporations, and then extend
to efficient MNCs or TNCs.
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220

For an excellent review and development of this work see Eduardo
Jo

White, Empresas Multinacionales Latino&mericana s; La Perspectiva

Del Derecho Economico,

(M~xico: Fonda De Cultura Econ6mica, 1973)0
The translation from the Spanish is mineo

230

EoJo White, opocito, Po 142.

240

In the Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume V, Number 2,
December 1966, pp. 181-1860

250

See E.J. White, op. cito, P• 83.

26.

For the description of Decision

46, I rely heavily on Gustavo

Fern!ndez Saavedra, "El 'Regimen Uniforme de la Empresa Multinacional
En El Grupo Andino", in Revista Derecho de la Integracifn, Buenos
Aires, 1972, pp. 11-33.
27.

See Daniel Schydlowsky, "Asignacion de Industrias De Integracibn en el
.,
INTAL, No. 8, May 1971,
Grupo Andino " , Revista de la I ntegracio~,

PPo 1-11.

28.

The subregional multinational firm would he formed within six months
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